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ABSTRACT
The study of national learning has been severely 
handicapped by the inability of scholars in the field to 
arrive at a consensus regarding the means by which nations 
learn. The purpose of this study is to help the field in 
its efforts to arrive at a common understanding of the 
dynamics of national learning.
This study first reviews the literature on national 
learning and describes one model of national learning 
created by Jack Levy. Levy's conceptualization of national 
learning identifies the individual learning experience of 
the bureaucrat or policy-maker as the starting point for 
national learning. According to Levy, following the 
personal learning experience of such a decision-maker, the 
individual then encodes his new-found beliefs into 
bureaucratic procedure. When this occurs within a 
governmental bureaucracy, national learning occurs, as the 
government is permanently predisposed to certain decisions 
as a result of the change in rules or procedures made by the 
individual learner.
The study next tests Levy's model in an attempt to 
determine if in fact its conceptualization of national 
learning is helpful to the field. Using the case of Jimmy 
Carter's dramatic personal learning experience following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this study finds Levy's 
definition to be lacking in both explanatory power as well 
as in its ability to predict when national learning will 
occur.
In its third and final phase, the study presents a new 
conceptualization of the dynamics of national learning. The 
proposed new model identifies public opinion as the catalyst 
to national learning. As the public learns, it induces 
legislators, through the power of public opinion, to make 
changes in bureaucratic procedure which are permanent.
Thus, national learning occurs. The study finds the new 
conceptualization of national learning to be more useful 
than Levy's in understanding the dynamics of national 
learning.
v
TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION 
OF NATIONAL LEARNING
INTRODUCTION
It is an eternal hope of man that nations will learn 
from history and the mistakes of other nations gone before 
and so steer a safer course for the future. But how do 
nations 1 learn", if they learn at all? What is the 
mechanism by which a nation learns lessons from the past? 
These questions are not merely academic in nature. Rather, 
their answers have profound implications for our world and 
the world of future generations. For if we can determine if 
in fact nations learn and identify the mechanism by which 
this learning occurs, we will be able to enhance our 
understanding of the international arena and predict much 
more accurately the behavior of states based on this 
improved understanding.
Unfortunately, the literature on national learning is 
lacking in consensus regarding the fundamental meaning of 
the concept of national learning. Though the term is used 
liberally, it appears that there exist almost as many 
theories regarding the means through which nations learn as
2
3there are scholars in the field. Moreover, these theories 
do not vary by nuance. Rather, each model is distinctive in 
its identification of the key actors, learning mechanisms 
and dependent variables involved in the national learning 
process. This lack of consensus poses obstacles to the 
advancement of the field. Much could be added to the field 
by the testing of some of the existing theories on national 
learning in an effort to eliminate those which prove to be 
of little utility in understanding the phenomena.
In this paper, I first offer a brief overview of the 
concepts of learning as they relate to learning at the 
national level. Second, I focus on one type of national 
learning theory which identifies bureaucratic change as the 
dependent variable and select one model from this group,
Jack Levy's, to evaluate its usefulness in understanding the 
dynamics of national learning. I select Levy's model 
because it is the most falsifiable of all the models 
reviewed. Jimmy Carter's learning experience following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is used as the test case. I 
find that though Levy's model predicts that national 
learning will occur as a result of individual learning by
4policy-makers, the Carter case study shows that this in fact 
does not occur. Thus, Levy's model is found to be lacking.
Finally, I offer an alternative means of understanding 
national learning which also identifies bureaucratic change 
as the dependent, variable but identifies a different 
learning mechanism from Levy's. Focusing on public opinion 
as the impetus to national learning, rather than the 
learning experiences of individual policy-makers, this model 
identifies the key actor in national learning to be the 
public, the learning mechanism to be the power of public 
opinion which induces legislators to affect change in 
bureaucratic procedure, and the dependent variable to be 
bureaucratic change. I believe this model to be of greater 
use to the field in its efforts to understand the dynamics 
of national learning.
I .
OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON LEARNING
Conceptions of learning in the field of international 
relations include a broad range of widely differing models. 
These models may be best understood if they are analyzed 
according to their conceptualizations of the three 
fundamental components of a learning model. The first 
component is the actor. While some models focus on key 
individuals within government, others perceive institutions 
to be the key actors in national learning. The second 
variable is the learning process itself. Scholars differ on 
the question of exactly what constitutes "learning". 
Different learning mechanisms are advanced by each model, 
some varying by nuance, others by significantly differing 
conceptualizations. Finally, these models vary in their 
identification of the dependent variable. While some seek 
to understand policy change, others view change in
5
6bureaucratic procedure or individual belief change as the 
dependent variable.
The neorealist approach to learning is distinct from 
other models in several ways. First, because this school 
believes that national learning occurs as a result of events 
at the international level, its primary actor is neither an 
individual nor an institution, but rather the nation-state 
as a whole, with its dependent variable being policy change. 
Foreign policy-making at the national level, according to 
the Neorealists, is a "black box"--the thought processes of 
national decision-makers or the ways in which governmental 
organizational cultures affect these decision-makers are not 
analyzed. Second, the neorealist approach is distinct in 
its model of the learning process. In an anarchic system, 
this model maintains, learning at the national level 
"involves the rational adjustment of policy in response to 
the reward and punishment contingencies of the international 
environment."1 Failure to learn results in a sort of
^■Philip E. Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet 
Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in 
Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, eds. George 
W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), 22.
Darwinian natural selection process in which those who are 
slow to learn do not survive.
Thus, the neorealists believe, "rational" governments 
respond to the incentives of the international environment 
in order to survive. Because the punishment for "incorrect 
action is elimination from the system, the decision-maker 
must act in accordance with the dictates of the structure o 
the international environment.2 Hence, greater analysis of 
the decision-maker or the organizational structure through 
which he operates is not necessary as international 
structural factors are the primary determinant of foreign 
policy.
In direct opposition to the neorealist approach are 
those who believe that sole reliance on the structural 
factors of the international community in explaining the 
actions of states is unsatisfactory. These scholars 
maintain that in a complex world, there is much causal 
ambiguity. Often, policy-makers receive contradictory 
feedback and interpretations of events which make the 
"rational" policy difficult to determine. Thus, "in an 
international environment that is complex to the point of
2Ibid., 24.
8indeterminate, even rational actors may be unable to 
anticipate the long-range consequences of their actions."3
For this reason, many scholars believe that learning at 
the domestic level needs to be taken into much greater 
account. Among those who believe that domestic politics 
play a significant role in learning at the national level, 
there are two distinct bodies of thought. The first 
includes those who believe that studying the learning 
processes of individual decision-makers is key to 
understanding learning at the national level. According to 
this group, the individual is the key actor. These scholars 
often borrow theories from the science of Psychology and 
apply them to beliefs regarding the international arena in 
order to better understand learning among key decision­
makers .
The second group includes those scholars who believe 
that in order to understand national learning we must 
examine political institutions and processes, since 
government as a whole is comprised of such organizations and 
decision-makers are constrained by them. Not only are 
decision-makers constrained by bureaucratic procedure and
3Ibid.,27.
9rules of accountability, but they are often jockeying among 
themselves for influence which further constrains their 
actions as they must negotiate with one another. Thus, this 
group of scholars identifies institutions as the key actors 
in models of national learning. In creating these models, 
scholars often borrow theories from the literature on 
organizational learning and apply it to governmental 
institutions to better understand learning at the national 
level, as they perceive the governmental learning to involve 
"the aggregation of learning by multiple organizations and 
by multiple individuals acting either through organizations 
or independently of them".4
Focusing on learning at the level of the individual 
decision-maker are those adhering to the belief system 
approach (otherwise known as the cognitive psychological 
approach). According to this framework, each decision-maker 
has a simplified image of the international environment. 
Emanating from this image are beliefs regarding the best 
ways to cope with this environment. These beliefs occur at 
three distinct levels: 1)fundamental assumptions and policy
4Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy:
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," in International 
Organization 48 (Spring 1994), 289.
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objectives, 2)strategic policy beliefs, and 3)tactical 
beliefs. Learning involves change in the cognitive content 
of these beliefs regarding the international environment.5 
Thus, the Belief System Approach identifies the individual 
policy-maker as the primary actor and belief change as the 
dependent variable in the learning process.
Within this group of scholars, there are those, such 
as Philip Tetlock, who believe that learning can occur at 
any of these three levels of belief. Tetlock envisions 
learning as a generic concept, treating it broadly and then 
differentiating among many types and degrees of learning.
As such, he "sees learning per se as a phenomenon that is to 
be observed fairly frequently in foreign policy-making."6 
According to Tetlock, changes in beliefs at the tactical, 
strategic or fundamental assumptions level of individuals 
all qualify as learning, although he believes that changes 
in belief at the fundamental assumptions level (otherwise 
known as complex learning) occur rarely.7
5Ibid., 22.
6George W. Breslauer, "What Have We Learned About 
Learning?" in Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign
Policy. 826.
7Ibid.
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Ernst Haas, in contrast, maintains that only a change 
in belief at the level of fundamental assumptions truly 
involves learning. Haas defines learning as "any change in 
behavior due to a change in perception about how to solve a 
problem".8 According to Haas, changes in belief at the 
strategic and tactical levels regarding the international 
environment are merely adaptation because they fail to 
examine the implicit theories underlying policies.9
Haas uses individual learning theory to explain 
learning at the organizational level. According to Haas, as 
individuals within bureaucracies begin to question 
fundamental beliefs regarding cause and effect, they tend to 
arrive at a consensus of beliefs. Thus, the following 
occurs:
A common understanding of causes is likely to 
trigger a shared understanding of solutions, and the 
new chain implies a set of larger meanings about 
life and nature not previously held in common by the 
participants.10
8Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Learning: Some 
Theoretical Speculations," in Learning in U.S. and 
Soviet Foreign Policy. 63.
9Ibid., 73.
10Ibid.
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Hence, according to Haas, as individuals within 
organizations arrive at newfound core beliefs, the 
organizations themselves tend to exhibit changes in 
collective patterns of behavior and Haas says that the 
organization has "learned".
Thus, Haas's conceptualization of national learning 
involves a two stage process. In the first stage, the 
individual is the primary actor and the dependent variable 
is belief change. In the second stage, however, as 
individuals arrive at a consensus of beliefs, the 
institution (being a collection of individuals) is the 
primary actor and bureaucratic change is the dependent 
variable. A fundamental problem with this theory is the 
ambiguity inherent in the term "collective patterns of 
behavior". If we were to try to test this theory, what 
patterns of behavior would we be examining? The theory 
suffers from the lack of a concrete dependent variable which 
may be examined in order to determine if learning has 
occurred.
The cognitive structural approach offers yet another 
approach to learning. While the above-described belief 
system approach focused on the cognitive content of one1s
13
image of the international arena, the cognitive structural 
approach examines the structural complexity of the image. 
Like the belief system approach, this model identifies 
change in belief as the dependent variable.
Proponents of this approach to learning, such as LLoyd 
Etheredge, define learning in terms of an increased 
cognitive differentiation and integration of thought.11 
Thus, as "the number of logically distinct arguments or 
considerations that a policy-maker takes into account in 
judging an event or arriving at a decision" increases, 
learning occurs.12
The efficiency model of learning offers yet another 
approach to individual learning. According to this 
conceptualization, "learning has occurred whenever policy 
makers have learned to match means and ends in more 
efficient or effective ways."13 In order to become more 
"efficient", one can either "discover more effective 
strategies for pursuing one's original goals, or one can
i:LLloyd Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
12Tetlock, 32.
13Tetlock, 35.
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redefine one's goals in more realistic ways."14 Thus, 
according to this model, the key actor is an individual 
policy-maker and the dependent variable is the policy 
itself. An individual has "learned" if, as a result of 
personal experience or observation, he becomes more adept or 
adroit at achieving the goals he values. Hence, this model 
perceives the key actors to be individuals and policy change 
to be dependent variable.
Implicit in the efficiency approach is the assumption 
that there exists concrete or generally accepted evidence 
which can be employed in evaluating whether or not the 
individual has become more "efficient" in pursuing his 
goals. While this consensus may exist in very controlled 
environments, it is difficult to attain in the complexity of 
the real world. As Tetlock states, "even the most tentative 
generalizations about deterrence or decision-making evoke 
spirited debate within the professional community".15 Thus, 
determining if in fact learning has occurred using this 
model can be difficult because there exists no
14Ibid.
15Ibid. , 36 .
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uncontroversial database that can be relied upon for 
assessing the accuracy of decisions.
Yet another model of learning advocated by Emanuel 
Adler emphasizes the role of ideas and epistemic communities 
in changing policy. Termed "evolutionary learning", this 
conceptualization of learning argues that policy-makers 
learn from epistemic communities. This approach links 
expert knowledge to political power in explaining learning 
at the national level and addresses how ideas become policy 
and the role of experts in this process.16 Like the 
efficiency model of national learning, the evolutionary 
learning model identifies the policy-maker as the key actor 
and policy as the dependent variable. Sarah Mendelson 
builds on this model by focusing on the interplay of ideas, 
the epistemic communities which support these ideas and "the 
political process through which the ideas are 
institutionalized and the people empowered." Mendelson 
argues that "ideas alone cannot explain any one outcome; 
they must be understood, rather, in terms of the political
16Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: 
National Epistemic Communities and the International 
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," 
International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).
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process by which they are selected. 1,17 Thus, Mendelson 
argues, the domestic political analysis, including 
strategies for power consolidation and coalition building, 
ideas and the epistemic communities promoting those ideas, 
should be included in a model of national learning.18
Jack Levy approaches the study of national learning 
from the institutional level, believing that because their 
rules and procedures constrain policy-makers, institutions 
are key actors in the national learning process. In his 
article, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual 
Minefield," Levy states that "organizations do not learn in 
the same sense that individuals do." Rather, they "learn 
only through individuals who serve in those organizations, 
by encoding individually learned inferences from experience 
into organizational routines."19 According to Levy, 
organizational learning involves "a multistage process in 
which environmental feedback leads to individual learning,
17Sarah E. Mendelson, "Internal Battles and 
External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (Winter 
1987-1988), 327.
18Ibid. , 359.
19Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy:
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International 
Organization 48 (Spring 1994), 287.
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which leads to a change in organizational behavior, which 
leads to further feedback."20 Thus, if learning has 
occurred at the national level, procedural changes should be 
in evidence within the bureaucracies which would be most 
closely related to the area in which learning has occurred. 
In order to test such a theory, we must know more precisely 
what is meant by "procedural changes". Levy writes that 
these changes involve' the "forms, rules, procedures, 
conventions, strategies, and technologies around which 
organizations are constructed and through which they 
operate, as well as the organizational culture and paradigms 
through which they are interpreted".21 Hence, Levy's model 
identifies the institution as the key actor and bureaucratic 
change the dependent variable.
Although much has been written about national learning 
in recent years, very few scholars have actually tested the 
variety of national learning models which have been 
advanced. This is unfortunate but understandable, as many 
of the national learning models lack a sufficiently well- 
defined means of determining if learning has occurred. The
20Ibid. , 288.
21Ibid. , 287.
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models do not clearly articulate the specific changes which 
need to be found in the dependent variable in order to 
determine if learning has occurred. Hence, as Karl Popper 
tried to make clear, the theories are not scientific because 
they are not falsifiable.22 As a result, there exists an 
abundance of existing theories in the field, but very little 
consensus among scholars regarding which one is most useful 
in understanding the dynamics of national learning.
One notable exception to this shortcoming among 
national learning models is the above-described model by 
Jack Levy. Like Haas's model, Levy identifies the key actor 
in national learning to be the governmental institution and 
the dependent variable to be bureaucratic change. However, 
unlike Haas's model for institutional learning which vaguely 
states that national learning has occurred when a 
governmental institution exhibits a change in "collective 
patterns of behavior", Levy goes one step further and offers 
a more exact means of determining if in fact learning has 
occurred by specifying what is meant by "procedural 
changes". He states clearly that bureaucracies should
22 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. 9th Impression; London, Hutchinson, 1977.
exhibit changes in "forms, rules procedures, conventions, 
strategies, and technologies1,23 Because his model is the 
most concrete one reviewed in its specification of changes 
to be studied.in the dependent variable and is thus 
falsifiable, it is this model which will be evaluated in 
this paper according to the contribution it makes to the 
understanding of the national learning process.
23Ibid, 287.
II.
TESTING A MODEL OF NATIONAL LEARNING: CARTER CASE STUDY
The goal of this thesis is twofold: l)to contribute to 
the study of national learning by testing one of the already 
existing models of national learning (Levy's) in an effort 
to evaluate its utility in understanding the dynamics of 
national learning, and 2) to offer an alternative model and 
direction for research should the Levy model prove lacking. 
The case study method serves the purpose of the first goal 
well. It is difficult to prove or confirm a theory using 
the case study method because it is often impossible to test 
all possible cases and thus the one disconfirming case could 
be overlooked. However, in attempting to disprove a theory, 
the case study method is satisfactory. If the theory can't 
make sense of this case, then it is not useful.
For several reasons, Jimmy Carter's learning 
experience following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 provides an ideal case with which to test Jack Levy's 
theory of national learning. Levy states that
20
21
organizational learning begins with the individual - an 
individual changes his beliefs as a result of an experience 
and in turn encodes those new beliefs in the bureaucracy 
through the revision of bureaucratic rules or procedures 
which would predispose the bureaucracy towards future 
decisions which would be consistent with the lessons 
learned.24 Therefore, in testing this definition, we must 
first look for an individual within the foreign policy­
making apparatus who fulfills two criteria. First, the 
individual must have undergone a significant change in 
belief as a result of personal experience which in turn 
affected his decisions regarding foreign policy. Second, 
the individual must be in a powerful enough position to have 
the ability to encode change reflecting his new found 
beliefs into organizational procedure.
Jimmy Carter fulfills these requirements on both 
counts and uhus provides the ideal case study with which to 
test Levy's theory. First, in 1979, following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, Carter dramatically changed his 
fundamental beliefs regarding the inherent nature of the 
U.S.S.R. Thus, even according to Haas's restrictive
24Ibid. , 288.
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definition of learning requiring a change in fundamental
assumptions and beliefs, Carter as an individual clearly, by
his own admission, learned with regards to the nature of the
Soviet Union.
Second, Carter was in a position to affect change
within the bureaucracies of the foreign policy-making
apparatus. It is difficult to imagine an individual with
more power to make procedural changes within government
organizations than the President of the United States.
Carter, unlike his predecessor, Richard Nixon, who to a
large degree delegated foreign policy formulation to Henry
Kissinger, wanted to take the lead in formulating foreign
policy and to be intimately involved in all policy
decisions. Testifying to this, his National Security
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, writes:
His personal involvement in the foreign policy 
process was assertive and extensive. He engaged 
himself deeply and he mastered impressively the 
technical arcana of the key issues...He made it 
clear to all that he was in charge...25
Thus, Carter clearly had not only the power to affect change
within the foreign policy-making apparatus, but the
25Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 521.
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interest, as well. Because Carter meets these two 
requirements so well, this case is an ideal one for testing 
Levy's theory. If Levy's model is a good one we should see 
some change in bureaucratic procedure during the Carter 
years commensurate with the magnitude of change which 
occurred in Carter's individual beliefs.
What exactly did Carter "learn" about the Soviets 
during his presidency? Which fundamental beliefs changed as 
a result of his experiences in foreign policy decision­
making? In order to determine this, we must analyze his 
beliefs regarding the Soviets before taking office and after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter came to the 
Presidency with a determination to make U.S. foreign policy 
more humane and moral. In a speech at the University of 
Notre Dame in May of 1977, Carter stated that he wanted "a 
foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on 
fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which 
we have, for humane purposes." He openly criticized the 
Nixon administration's policies for emphasizing too heavily 
balance-of-power politics.26
26Ibid. , 48 .
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Carter's views on foreign affairs apparently were 
largely formed through his work with the Trilateral 
Commission. The Trilateral Commission was founded by David 
Rockefeller in order to provide a forum for elite debate and 
accommodation to international change. Its parent is the 
Council on Foreign Relations, a private U.S. organization 
founded in 1918 and a powerful force in shaping U.S. public 
policy and opinion.27 The Trilateral Commission's some 3 00 
members are drawn from'international business, banking, 
government, academia, media and conservative labor.28 Its 
key concept is 'complex interdependence1.29 This 
perspective holds that the "days of outright U.S. hegemony, 
based on the drive towards military and economic 
superiority" are over. As such, the U.S. needs to support a 
new collaborative internationalism, with the economic 
dimension gaining ascendancy over the military, in order to
27John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993'), 111-
112 .
28Holly Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependence 
and Democracy-An Overview," in Trilateralismf ed. Holly 
Sklar (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 2.
29Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the 
Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 222.
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construct a framework for international stability in the 
coming decades.30 Thus, the commission strives to engage 
America, Japan and Western Europe in an effort to promote a 
more cooperative world. Its sessions are dedicated to 
themes such as aid for the developing countries, 
arrangements for fairer exploitation of the oceans and 
programs to delay or halt the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Carter selected the bulk of his foreign policy­
making team from among his associates on the commission, 
including such key players as Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, 
Andrew Young and Zbigniew Brzezinski.31 In 1977, no fewer 
than twenty-five members of the Trilateral Commission served 
in the highest posts of the administration.32
Finally, Carter had an "intense and instinctive desire 
to go down in history as the peacemaker".33 To this end, he 
pursued more cordial relations with Brezhnev and the Soviet 
Union. For this reason, SALT was of particular interest to 
him, as he perceived it to be a means for stabilizing the
30Dumbre 11, 111.
31Sklar, 100-101.
32Ibid. , 2.
33Brzezinski, 520.
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U.S.-Soviet relationship and also for reducing the nuclear 
threat to human survival.34 Cyrus Vance recalls that during 
his first meeting with then President-elect Carter, Carter 
"made clear that one of his highest priorities would be to 
conclude a new SALT agreement, and without linking it to 
other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations."35 Reflecting the 
importance which Carter placed on further nuclear arms 
control agreements, he writes in his memoirs, "Our failure 
to ratify the SALT II treaty and to secure even more far- 
reaching agreements on nuclear arms control was the most 
profound disappointment of my Presidency."36
However, international events occurring during the 
Carter Administration's tenure served to push Carter from a 
globalist or interdependent world view focused on 
cooperation towards one reminiscent of containment and the 
Cold War. It is possible to identify six key "disturbances" 
in the international'arena which had a cumulative influence 
over time in reshaping Carter's world view. These
34Ibid. , 50 .
35Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), 31.
36Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1982), 265.
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contributed to a perception of his early optimism regarding 
the "global community" as being naive and led him to a shift 
towards the more "hawkish" views of Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
particularly with regard to the Soviet Union.37
The first of these events occurred in February of 1977 
when a Marxist regime seized power in Ethiopia and proceeded 
to undertake full-scale war against Somalia over the 
latter's territorial claims in Ethiopia. Although the 
Soviets had initially supported the Somalis, by the fall of 
1977 they had aligned themselves with the Ethiopians and had 
dispatched thousands of Cuban troops to the region in order 
to provide military assistance.
Increasingly, Carter began to perceive this activity 
in the African Horn coupled with the expansion of Soviet 
influence and military presence in South Yemen to be a 
potentially grave threat to the U.S. position in the Middle 
East, notably in the Arabian peninsula. By late summer of 
1977, there was growing evidence of Soviet sponsored 
involvement in Africa. This prompted the President to
37Dumbrell, 12 8-129.
28
direct Andrew Young to make a speech at the U.N. on November 
22, 1977 against the Soviet Cuban presence in Africa.38
This tougher stance by Carter was evident in his March
1978 foreign policy speech at Wake Forest University. In
this speech, he warned:
Our strategic forces must be-and must be known to 
be-a match for the capabilities of the Soviets.
They will never be able to use their nuclear forces 
to threaten, to coerce, or to blackmail us or our 
friends ... Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements 
with our adversaries can limit the cost of security 
and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must- 
and we will-proceed efficiently with whatever arms 
programs our own security requires.39
Shortly after this speech, in May of 1978, yet another
invasion of Zaire was launched from Angola, with Carter
again charging that Cubans were involved. After the U.S.
responded with an airlift of French, Belgian and Moroccan
troops, the situation calmed. Following this incident, in a
June, 1978, speech on foreign policy Carter projected an
even tougher stance than before towards the Soviet Union.
He was unequivocal in stating continued U.S. commitment to
human rights and his speech was devoid of all conciliatory
passages towards the U.S.S.R. which had marked previous
38Brzezinski, 179.
39Ibid. , 189.
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speeches. In the speech, Carter offered the Soviets the 
choice of either "confrontation or cooperation" and warned 
that the "U.S. is adequately prepared to meet either 
choice" .40
At about the same time, the Soviet Union offered an- 
even greater provocation to Carter. By placing on trial 
several prominent dissidents, it seemed to be, directly 
challenging the Carter Administration's stand on human 
rights. All of the dissidents were found guilty and Carter 
condemned the trials as "an attack on every human being in 
the world who believes in basic human freedoms."41 Carter 
responded not only with words, but with actions. He 
approved economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, 
including restrictions on the export of gas and oil 
technology, suspension of scientific exchanges and the 
cancellation of computer equipment deliveries. These 
actions gain in significance when it is understood that this 
is the first time since the inception of detente under
40Ibid. , 320.
41Dumbrell, 125-126.
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President Nixon that an American Administration had applied 
sanctions against the U.S.S.R.42
Also representative of Carter's hardening attitude 
towards the Soviet Union was his decision in May of 1978 to 
send Brzezinski to China with the intention of paving the 
way towards normalization. This followed the breakdown 
earlier that year of Soviet efforts to improve relations 
with the Chinese and was undoubtedly viewed with great 
concern in the U.S.S.R.43
If in 1978 the Carter Administration had inched toward 
a tougher stance vis-a-vis the Soviets, by the end of 1979 
it had lunged towards it. Several key events in 1979 are 
responsible for this shift. First, the U.S. lost two 
longtime American allies in the collapse of the Somoza 
regime in Nicaragua and the Pahvlavi regime in Iran. In 
1978 and 1979, the regime of Anastasio Somoza, a long time 
American ally, collapsed before a coalition of Marxist 
revolutionaries, the Sandinista National Liberation Front. 
American policy was to push Somoza towards a mediated
42Ibid. , 126.
43James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United 
States Foreign Policy and World Orderr 4th ed., (New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 362.
31
settlement. This attempt failed and by mid-1979, the Carter 
administration recognized the new revolutionary 
government.44
However, if the collapse of Somoza was disturbing, the 
loss of Iran, a surrogate for American power in the Persian 
Gulf, was catastrophic. On January 16, 1979 the Shah fled 
Iran in the midst of a revolution against his regime led by 
the exiled fundamentalist Islamic leader the Ayatollah 
Khomeni. On February 1, the Ayatollah returned from exile 
in Paris and assumed power. Because much of the revolution 
was fueled by intense resentment of a regime that was 
perceived to be illegitimate and a puppet government run by 
the United States, the U.S. lost a key ally in the region 
with no hope of regaining the foothold with the new 
government that it had lost with the old. This represented 
a considerable security risk to the U.S., considering its 
dependence on the oil of the Persian Gulf for the 
maintenance of its economy.45
Despite the cooling of relations between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. which had been occurring since mid-1978, Carter
44Ibid. , 369.
45Ibid.
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and Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement in June of 1979. 
Almost immediately, however, the treaty was jeopardized by 
yet another international problem. On August 31, 1979, 
during the course of hearings and debates in the Senate on 
SALT II, Carter reported that intelligence sources had 
revealed a Soviet brigade of combat troops present in Cuba. 
Although it had been generally known that there had been 
Soviet troops in Cuba for the last seventeen years, the 
announcement caused considerable furor.46
The administration continued to hold out hope, 
however, that SALT II would be ratified by the end of 1979 
or perhaps in early 1980. Even this hope was abandoned when 
in December of 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.47 
The invasion was in support of a pro-Soviet coup directed 
against a Marxist regime which proved unable to be 
controlled from Moscow and was unable to control its own 
Islamic insurgents. By December 27, 1979, its leader was 
dead and the Soviets appeared to be staying until a new pro- 
Soviet regime was well-established.48
46Brzezinski, 346.
47Ibid. , 353.
48Nathan and Oliver, 372-373.
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Although intelligence sources had reported Soviet 
troop movements along the borders for sometime, the invasion 
transformed Carter. As Vance writes in his memoirs, "The 
Soviet invasion into Afghanistan changed the picture".49 
LLoyd Cutler refers to Carter's "metamorphosis" following 
the invasion.50 Carter sent Brezhnev the most sharply 
worded message of his presidency, warning him that the 
invasion represented a "clear threat to peace and could mark 
a fundamental and longlasting turning point in our 
relations."51 Perhaps the most compelling evidence of 
Carter's dramatic change in belief regarding the Soviet 
Union, however, is his revelation during an interview on New 
Year's Eve, 1979 that his "opinion of the Russians has 
changed more drastically in the last week than in the 
previous two and a half years."52
49Vance, 3 90.
50Joseph G. Bock, The White House Staff and the 
National Security Assistant (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987) , 146 .
51Carter, 472.
52David Bender, "Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling 
Facts About Afghan Coup," New York Times. 1 January
1980, p. 1 (A).
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Carter's learning experience is not only clear in his 
words, but in his actions, as well. He writes in his 
memoirs:
The Soviet Union, like Iran, had acted outrageously, 
and at the same time had made a strategic 
miscalculation. I was determined to lead the rest 
of the world in making it as costly as possible.53
Carter proceeded to back these words with actions.
Whereas prior to the invasion he maintained a policy of
evenhandedness between the USSR and the PRC regarding dual-
use technology, following the invasion Carter decided to
offer China non-lethal military equipment and allow high
technology transfers which were not being offered to the
Soviets.54 In addition, a grain embargo was established
against the Soviet Union and the decision was made for the
U.S. to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics to be held in
Moscow. Possibly of greatest import to Carter, however, was
his decision to put on hold indefinitely the SALT II treaty
from the Senate ratification process.55 As he was later to
write in his memoirs, "The worst disappointment to me
53Carter, 472.
54Vance, 3 91.
“ Brzezinski, 431.
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personally was the immediate and automatic loss of any
chance for early ratification of the SALT II treaty. 1,56
The most significant outcome of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, however, was the renewed commitment to
rebuilding America's defense and the expansion of her
security commitments to include the Persian Gulf area. On
January 23, 1980, in his State of the Union address, Carter
announced what later was to be called the "Carter Doctrine",
linking the Persian Gulf and its oil to the vital interests
of the United States. Carter stated unequivocally:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by 
any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.57
Thus, America's interests were explicitly linked to those of
the Persian Gulf region.
In order to defend these interests, Carter declared,
"We have a new will at home to do what is required to keep
us the strongest nation on earth".58 In practical terms,
these declarations meant a renewed commitment to the build-
56Carter, 473 .
57Brzezinski, 426.
58Nathan and Oliver, 373.
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up of U.S. military might, including a defense budget five 
percent higher than the previous year and planned spending 
on defense that would lead to about five percent per year 
increases through the middle of the next decade. In 
addition, a rapid deployment force was established which 
would be capable of moving as many as one hundred thousand 
men any where in the world with little advance notice.59 
Thus, by early 198 0, detente had been virtually abandoned 
and the administration had turned toward a reemphasis of 
security policy reminiscent of the containment policies of 
the Cold War. It seemed clear that early advocates of 
interdependence and world order policies no longer shaped 
the administration's image of international realities.60 
Carter now believed that the Soviet Union was not only 
morally bankrupt, but expansionist as well. He viewed his 
earlier optimism and global community outlook as naive.61
Thus, Carter experienced a revolutionary change in his 
beliefs regarding the Soviet Union specifically and the 
nature of international relations in general. Initially
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
61Dumbrell, 12 9.
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embracing a "dovish" approach, by the end of his 
administration he clearly favored a more "hawkish" view akin 
to that of his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. By all accounts, including his own, he had 
experienced a dramatic change in belief which transformed 
his fundamental assumptions about the Soviet Union in 
particular and the nature of international relations in 
general. Therefore, even according to the more restrictive 
belief system approach to learning advocated by Ernst Haas 
and certainly according to Jack Levy's definition of 
individual learning as involving a "change of beliefs, 
skills, or procedures based on the observation and 
interpretation of experience," Carter as an individual 
"learned" as a result of his experiences with the Soviets.62
This learning experience produced many policy changes, 
such as the Carter Doctrine, the establishment of the rapid 
deployment force, the withdrawal of SALT II from the 
ratification process and a dramatic increase in the defense 
budget for the coming years. As significant as these policy 
changes were, according to Levy, policy changes alone do not 
constitute national learning. Rather, learning at the
62Levy, 2 96.
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national level involves the encoding of bureaucratic 
procedure which predisposes future decision-makers towards 
outcomes consistent with the learning process.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine if in fact 
Carter translated his learning experience into permanent 
change in bureaucratic routine affecting the foreign policy­
making process. Because the making of foreign policy is a 
complicated affair, it would help in analyzing this case if 
we broke down the foreign policy-making process into smaller 
components which can be more carefully studied for evidence 
of procedural change. Philip Zelikow, in his recent article 
"Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and 
Back Again, 1 offers a description of the policy construction 
process which serves this function. Zelikow states that 
policy-making may be conceptualized as three interacting 
streams, each of which interact constantly with the other. 
The three streams are problem recognition, policy 
engineering and politics, which is defined as the way 
choices are made. Zelikow describes policy engineering as 
the formation and refining of policy proposals.63 It is
63Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering:
From Theory to Practice and Back Again, " in 
International Security 18 (Spring 1994), 157.
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logical to assume that it is within the policy engineering 
stream that bureaucratic procedural change could most 
clearly be identified.
Because bureaucracies such as the State Department and 
National Security Council are sites for the formation of 
foreign policy options, it is probable that bureaucratic 
change affecting foreign policy would be found within these 
two entities. Therefore, these two institutions will be 
examined in an effort to identify evidence of the encoding 
of personal beliefs into bureaucratic routine. Zelikow 
identifies the following seven components to policy 
engineering: national interest, objectives, strategy, design 
(preliminary and detailed), implementation, maintenance, and 
review.64 By carefully studying bureaucratic procedures 
affecting these seven areas, we can determine if in fact 
Carter encoded procedural change into any of the 
bureaucracies dealing with these areas.
Zelikow defines national interest as a "non- 
operational goal which is often used as a general 
rationalization for whatever preferences actually undergird 
a policy" . He writes further that expressions of national
64Ibid. , 159.
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interest "only become a meaningful component of policymaking 
when the pronouncement tells people something significant 
that they did not already know about the future directions 
and commitments of the government".65 Was there a change in 
or reconceptualization of national interest following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Yes, the Carter Doctrine 
linking the security of the Persian Gulf to the vital 
interests of the United States clearly emphasized anew 
America's commitment to this area and marked a new reference 
point for the formation of policy.
Certainly, then, the invasion did change American 
foreign policy. Was this change in policy, however, 
accompanied by a permanent change in bureaucratic procedure 
that would outlast Carter? No, a major shift in the tenor 
of U.S. policy occurred through the Carter Doctrine, but 
there is no evidence of any procedural changes in the policy 
engineering process in the six other areas identified by 
Zelikow which would indicate a permanent encoding of 
Carter's new beliefs into bureaucratic procedure. No 
significant change in bureaucratic routines affecting policy 
objectives, strategy, design, implementation, maintenance or
65Ibid. , 160-161.
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review could be found. By "significant", I mean changes 
which would be commensurate with the about face in beliefs 
which Carter experienced following the invasion. Thus, 
though policy change occurred, no permanent change in 
bureaucratic routine affecting foreign policy occurred as a 
result of Carter's learning experiences.
These findings call into question the usefulness of 
Jack Levy's model of learning at the national level. It 
appears that following an individual-level learning 
experience, individuals do not in fact encode their new 
found beliefs into bureaucratic procedure causing the nation 
itself to "learn" and change its ways permanently. The 
Carter case study, as was mentioned before, offers an ideal 
means for testing this theory due to 1) Carter's dramatic 
learning experience and 2) his powerful position within the 
government. Yet, no bureaucratic procedural changes could 
be found. This calls into question whether or not an 
individual's change in belief, no matter how dramatic, is 
sufficient for learning to occur at the national level as 
Levy defines it.
Ill.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF NATIONAL LEARNING
If national learning does not occur as a result of an 
individual's change in belief, how does a nation learn? 
What, if anything, does promote permanent change in 
bureaucratic procedure and routine which survives 
administrative changes and the associated change in policy? 
It is my opinion that learning at the national level occurs 
not as a result of individual learning which is then encoded 
into bureaucratic procedure, but rather as a result of 
collective learning by the American people which ignites a 
groundswell in public opinion strong enough to permanently 
affect the ways in which our government makes decisions (as 
opposed to the decisions themselves, which would merely be 
policy changes). In a sense the nation as a whole "learns".
This conceptualization is supported by recent research 
which finds that public opinion on foreign policy and 
national security issues is relatively stable, not volatile
42
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or moody as was once commonly believed.66 This research 
challenges the idea that "the public is not sufficiently 
informed to reach logical or stable attitudes on foreign 
affairs."67 Rather, the American public, according to 
Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page, collectively is 
"rational". Public opinion is real, accurately measurable 
by survey and highly stable.68 As Thomas Graham writes, "If 
public opinion is sufficiently strong, it can make decisions 
virtually automatic. Consensus level mass attitudes can 
have more impact on decisions than powerful bureaucratic 
players" .69
An example of learning precipitated by public opinion 
is the restraint imposed upon the Executive Branch's war- 
making abilities following the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War 
was one of the most painful experiences in the entire 
history of the United States. An undeclared war in which
66Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy Decision Making," in The New Politics of 
American Foreign Policyr ed. David A. Deese (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1994), 193.
67Ibid. , 194.
68Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign 
Policy and Public Opinion," in The New Politics of 
American Foreign Policy. 217.
69Graham, 2 08.
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50,000 U.S. troops died, the war was primarily waged by the 
Executive Branch with Congress having little input into the 
goals and strategies of the war. Although Congress 
initially approved the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
granting the president broad authority to wage war in 
Vietnam, after-1965, neither Johnson nor Nixon sought 
congressional approval for their war decisions.
Nevertheless, Congress continually voted in favor of 
military appropriations and the draft, without which Johnson 
and Nixon could not have waged war.
However, due to the growing number of U.S. casualties 
in Vietnam, the uncertainty as to whether or not the war 
could be won, and the doubts about the morality of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. public increasingly turned 
against the war. Responding to this change in public 
sentiment, Congress began to assert its war powers. In 
1969, the Senate passed the National Commitments Resolution. 
Although it lacked the force of law, the resolution 
articulated the Senate's feeling that a national commitment
45
"results only from affirmative action taken by the 
legislative and executive branches." 70
As the war dragged into the early 1970's, hostility 
towards the war in the minds of the American people 
continued to grow. In addition, Nixon undertook a series of 
controversial military actions without consulting Congress 
that highlighted to Congress its relative inability to 
affect policy. Furthermore, Nixon's covert war in Cambodia 
in 1970 and the publication of the Pentagon papers in 1971 
revealing the executive branch's deceptions during the 
1960's increased the Congress's resolve to limit the war- 
making powers of the president.
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution 
curbing presidential war-making and requiring that the 
"collective judgement" of the President and Congress be used 
regarding the introduction of U.S. troops to hostilities and 
the length of time of their involvement. Specifically, this 
resolution mandated that three main procedures be used to 
govern the deployment of U.S. forces: 1) the President must 
consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before he
70Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher, eds.
Encyclopedia of the American Presidency (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994), s.v. "Vietnam War."
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introduces troops into hostilities 2) the President must 
report to Congress within forty-eight hours after the 
introduction of troops into hostilities, triggering the 
beginning of Congressional oversight 3) after the initial 
report by the President to Congress on the commitment of 
troops, the President must terminate the use of U.S. forces 
after sixty days unless Congress has declared war or 
authorized the action.71
Thus, the War Powers Resolution is a clear example of 
public opinion precipitating a permanent change in 
"bureaucratic procedure", which, according to Levy, 
constitutes national learning. This change directly 
predisposes the policy-making process towards certain 
contingencies consistent with the learning which triggered 
the procedural change in the first place. In this case, 
public concern over the unilateral war-making of the 
executive branch sparked a belief change in Congress 
regarding its role in the waging of war. Congress then took 
steps to permanently change the bureaucratic procedures for 
war-making by encoding its new-found beliefs into a law 
which predisposes the president towards greater
71Levy and Fisher, "War Powers Resolution."
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accountability to Congress. Thus, the nation, expressing 
itself through Congress, "learned" because its beliefs were 
encoded into law which has lasted twenty years and outlasted 
five different administrations.
A second example of national learning occurring due to 
a change in public beliefs is the Intelligence Oversight Act 
of 1980. Like the War Powers Act, this act grew out of the 
public's disillusionment with Vietnam. However, it was also 
precipitated by public outrage following revelations 
regarding the CIA's involvement during the 1960's and 1970's 
in covert operations including assassination plots against 
foreign leaders and the attempted overthrow of 
democratically elected leaders.72
Beginning with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 
requiring the President to inform Congress of covert 
operations in a reasonable timeframe, the movement gained 
momentum. In 1976 and 1977 both the House and the Senate 
established permanent committees to oversee the activities 
of the CIA. This drive for greater control over covert 
operations culminated in the Intelligence Oversight Act of 
1980. This act, like its predecessor the Hughes-Ryan
72Levy and Fisher, "Intelligence Oversight Act."
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Amendment, required the President to 1) find that a covert 
operation was vital to the national security of the country 
and 2) notify relevant congressional committees. However, 
the Intelligence Oversight Act expanded on the Hughes-Ryan 
Act by requiring the President to report any covert 
operations conducted by any governmental organizations, not 
just the CIA. In addition, it stated that the President 
must give prior notification of covert activities to 
relevant congressional committees.73
Thus, the Intelligence Oversight Act, like the War 
Powers Act, is an example of a groundswell of public opinion 
resulting in learning at the national level. As a 
consequence of public outrage following revelations of 
covert activities authorized by the executive branch, the 
American people, acting through Congress, tried to assert 
greater control over the nation's foreign policy decision­
making. The nation's new-found beliefs were encoded into 
law in the form of restrictions on the executive branch. 
These restrictions are permanent, spanning administrations, 
and because they must be considered by the executive branch 
before it authorizes covert operations, they predispose the
73Ibid.
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president towards greater caution due to his increased 
accountability towards Congress. Thus, the nation learns 
from its past not as a result of the experiences of one 
individual, but rather following the experiences of many 
individuals collectively expressed as "public opinion".
A third and final example of national learning 
prompted by strong public concern is the criteria outlined
9
by Caspar Weinberger in 1984 regarding America's commitment 
of troops to combat. As Secretary of Defense, Caspar 
Weinberger established "six major tests to be applied when 
we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad" 74 
Though not officially written into law or encoded into 
bureaucratic procedure, these criteria nonetheless continue 
to be recognized as conditions that should be met before 
troops are committed to combat.
The first criteria stated that before committing 
troops to combat, the U.S. must be certain that the 
engagement is vital to our national interest or that of our 
allies. Second, no troops should be committed unless we are 
willing to commit enough resources and troops to win. As
74Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New 
York: Warner Brothers, 1990), 441.
50
Weinberger stated, "If we are unwilling to commit the forces 
or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should 
not commit them at all." Third, assuming we do decide to 
commit troops, the U.S. must have clearly defined political 
and military objectives and well-defined and specified 
strategies for achieving those objectives. Fourth, because 
conditions often change as a conflict continues, the U.S. 
must constantly reassess and change accordingly the 
"relationship between our objectives and the forces we have 
committed--their size, composition and disposition". Fifth, 
the American public and their elected representatives in 
Congress must be supportive of the endeavor or we should not 
send troops into combat. Sixth, "the commitment of U.S. 
forces to combat should be a last resort".75
Like the War Powers Act and the Intelligence Oversight 
Act, these criteria emanated from a recognition by policy­
makers of mistakes made in the past regarding the commitment 
of U.S. troops to combat and the resulting reaction from the 
American public these mistakes engendered. Weinberger 
states, "while these tests are drawn from lessons we have 
* learned from the past, they also can--and should--be applied
75Ibid. , 441-445.
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to the future." More specifically, he cites lessons learned 
in World War II, Korea and Vietnam in establishing these 
criteria. For example, in discussing the need for strong 
support at home before committing troops abroad, Weinberger 
declares, "We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at 
home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in 
the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, 
but just to be there."76
These six criteria constitute an example of national
learning for three reasons. First, as was described above,
they arose from the collective experience of the American
people at war, expressing itself in strong public opinion
favoring greater discretion in the commitment of U.S. troops
to combat. Having learned the lessons of Korea and Vietnam
and knowing American public opinion towards these conflicts,
Weinberger states:
...recent history has proven that we cannot assume 
unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We 
have learned that there are limits to how much of 
our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to 
forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace 
and freedom.77
76Ibid. , 442-443.
77Ibid. , 439.
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Thus, these criteria clearly arose from the American 
public's reaction to its recent past.
Second, the six criteria are designed, as Levy states,
to "dispose the system in certain ways--presumably better
than before--to future contingencies."78 In the speech to
the National Press Club in which Weinberger outlined the six
criteria, he stated the following:
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased 
negatively for a purpose--they are intended to sound 
a note of caution--caution that we must observe 
prior to committing forces to combat overseas. When 
we ask our military forces to risk their very lives 
in such situations, a note of caution is not only 
prudent, it is morally required.79
Thus, Weinberger's six criteria were clearly intended to
steer policy-makers toward more careful review of a given
situation before committing troops, and, if the decision is
made to commit troops, careful forethought and planning
regarding the objectives and strategy of the mission. In
this regard, they clearly "dispose the system" towards
greater caution in the commitment of troops.
Third, though not written into legislation or encoded 
into bureaucratic procedure, these six criteria nonetheless
78Levy, 2 88.
79Weinberger, 443.
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have proven to be permanent, being used in policy-making for 
the past ten years and spanning three administrations. For 
example, as will be shown below, it is clear that Clinton 
used these six criteria in evaluating whether or not to 
commit troops to combat in Haiti. It is significant to note 
that this decision was made in 1994, a full ten years after 
Weinberger's initial introduction of the six criteria. 
Further, the use of these criteria crosses partisan lines.
It is reasonable to say, therefore, that the use of these 
criteria is a "permanent" change in bureaucratic procedure.
Weinberger's six criteria are clearly evident in 
President Clinton's decision to commit troops to the 
invasion of Haiti. 'Clinton, in his speech to the nation on 
September 15, 1994, discusses at length all six criteria as 
they pertain to the Haiti situation. First, a large portion 
of his speech is devoted to detailing the ways in which the 
reinstatement of democracy in Haiti was indeed in the 
national interest of the United States. "History has taught 
us," Clinton explains, "that preserving democracy in our own 
hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity." 
Further, he maintains, if we don't act "we will continue to 
face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its
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constant threat to stability in our region and control of 
our borders." Finally, Clinton explains that it is in our 
national interest to invade in order to "uphold the 
reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments 
others make to us."80
Clinton also clearly considered Weinberger's second 
criteria in deciding on the strength of the forces to be 
used during the invasion. Although it is generally believed 
that troops would meet little resistance from the meager 
Haitian army, the Pentagon committed a force of 20,000 U.S. 
troops to the invasion, "an overwhelming force intended to 
minimize casualties."81 Thus, Clinton fulfills Weinberger's 
criteria of committing troops "wholeheartedly, and with the 
clear intention of winning."82
Addressing Weinberger's third criteria, Clinton 
describes our mission in Haiti as being "achievable and 
limited" and states that it is similar to our missions in
80"Clinton's Speech: The Reason's Why," New York 
Times. 16 September 1994, 10 (A).
81Kevin Fedarko, "This Time We Mean Business," 
Time, 19 September 1994, 33.
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Panama and Grenada in that it is "limited and specific".83 
He then proceeds to outline in detail the two phases of the 
mission, their objectives and the means by which these 
objectives will be carried out. In doing so he addresses 
Weinberger's insistence on "clearly defined political and 
military objectives" and knowing "precisely how our forces 
can accomplish those clearly defined objectives."84
Weinberger's fourth criteria involves the constant 
reassessment of the "relationship between our objectives and 
the forces we have committed-their size, composition and 
disposition".85 Such a reassessment has already occurred, 
as the troops were not initially allowed to intervene in the 
actions of the Haitian police. However, after it became 
clear that the troops were demoralized by being unable to 
intervene in clear cases of abuse of the Haitian people by 
its police force, this policy was changed. Thus, a 
reevaluation in objectives did occur.
Clinton clearly abided by Weinberger's fifth criteria 
in committing troops to Haiti. Weinberger insists on having
83"Clinton's Speech," A (10).
84Weinberger, 441.
85Ibid.
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"the support of the American people and their elected 
representatives in Congress" before committing troops to 
combat. According to a Time/CNN poll taken in August, only 
31% of the American electorate supported sending troops into 
Haiti.86 This criteria clearly entered into Clinton's 
decision-making process. He acknowledged in his speech of 
September 15 that he is aware that "many people believe that 
we shouldn't help the Haitian people recover their democracy 
and find their hard-won freedom. . . 1,87 This fact clearly 
predisposed him to greater caution in making his decision. 
Though faced with the possibility of losing credibility on 
the world stage if he did not invade, he nonetheless had 
great difficulty in arriving at the decision in large part 
due to lack of support from Congress and the American 
people. Politically, it clearly was an unpopular move and 
this had the effect of delaying his decision to invade and 
trying every possible alternative to avoid force.
Ultimately, this led him to allow the envoy of Jimmy Carter, 
Sam Nunn and Colin Powell to travel to Haiti just prior to
86Bruce W. Nelan, "Invasion on Hold," Time f 15 
August 1994, 23.
87"Clinton's Speech," A (10).
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the planned invasion in an effort to find a peaceful 
solution. This effort was successful and invasion was 
transformed into a peace-keeping mission. Thus, the lack of 
support of the American people was clearly considered by 
Clinton.
Finally, Clinton clearly meets Weinberger's sixth 
criteria of making the "commitment of U.S. troops to combat 
a last resort". Over and over again in his speech he 
describes the many ways in which the U.S. has attempted to 
remove Cedras and reinstate Aristide and democracy through 
peaceful means. He states that for "three years we and 
other nations have worked exhaustively to find a diplomatic 
solution". Later, he stresses that despite the failure of 
these efforts, "the nations of the world continued to seek a 
peaceful solution". At the end of his address, he again 
states, "Let me say again, the nations of the world have 
tried every possible way to restore Haiti's democratic 
government peacefully. 1,88 Although these statements 
themselves testify to the importance which Clinton attaches 
to using force as a last resort, perhaps an even more 
compelling testament to this fact was his sending of Carter,
88Ibid.
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Nunn and Powell to Haiti to seek a diplomatic solution even 
as the invasion plans were underway.
Clearly, then, Weinberger's six criteria were 
considered by the Clinton administration as it deliberated 
about the commitment of troops to combat in Haiti. Though 
not formally encoded in bureaucratic procedure, the criteria 
nonetheless served to sway the administration towards 
greater caution in its commitment despite the potential loss 
of credibility in the world arena should the U.S. not 
invade. Moreover, the consideration of this criteria may in 
fact have forestalled the invasion itself as the 
administration tried genuinely, even at the eleventh hour, 
to try every possible means to avoid combat. In this 
regard, it certainly served its intended purpose in 
predisposing decision-makers towards greater prudence in the 
commitment of U.S. troops to war.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In assessing the usefulness of a given theoretical 
model, it is necessary to examine both the model's ability 
to predict the future as well as its explanatory power.
Jack Levy's model of national learning has been shown to be 
lacking according to both criteria. Levy defines individual 
learning as a "change of beliefs, the degree of confidence 
in one's beliefs or skills as a result of the observation 
and interpretation of experience."89 According to this 
definition, Jimmy Carter, as a result of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the events preceding it, clearly learned. 
Therefore, if Levy's model of national learning is correct, 
Carter should have encoded his new-found beliefs into 
foreign policy bureaucratic procedure at some level of the 
policy engineering process in order to predispose the 
process towards decisions in accordance with his new 
beliefs. Yet, as has been described, no evidence of change
89Levy, 311.
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in procedure as a result of Carter's learning is evident. 
Hence, though individual policy-makers may in fact learn, it 
seems they do not take the critical second step and 
translate this learning into bureaucratic procedure. Thus, 
Levy's model fails in its ability to predict when national 
learning will occur.
Moreover, in examining those cases where bureaucratic 
procedure clearly has been permanently changed and thus, 
according to Levy's own definition, national learning has 
occurred, Levy's model fails to explain this learning 
process. In all three cases of national learning described 
above, no individual policy-maker acting as a result of a 
personal learning experience is responsible for the change 
in bureaucratic procedure. Rather, the change emanates from 
the learning experiences of the American public as a whole. 
Because Levy's model fails to explain these dynamics, it is 
not useful in helping us to better understand national 
learning.
Thus, having examined a state-of-the-art model of 
national learning and found it to be lacking in its ability 
to both explain and predict the phenomena of national 
learning, I propose a revised conceptualization of national
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learning which I believe more accurately reflects the 
dynamics at work in the process of national learning. 
Hopefully, this model will prove more useful to political 
scientists in understanding national learning.
As was described above in the discussion of the War 
Powers Act, the Intelligence Oversight Act and Weinberger's 
six criteria for committing troops to combat, it seems clear 
that rather than an individual bureaucrat being the catalyst 
for national learning, public opinion is the determining 
factor. It seems to make intuitive sense that in a 
democracy, permanent change will not result from the 
personal experience of one individual, but rather will only 
occur as the result of a movement from the people 
themselves. According to my research, this intuition proves 
correct. Thus, my model identifies the individual voter as 
the key to understanding national learning. According to 
this model, the individual voter receives environmental 
feedback which in turn leads to a change in his or her 
beliefs. This change in belief, or learning, occurs on a 
broad scale among the electorate, developing into a mass 
consensus of beliefs. This mass consensus of beliefs, in 
turn, expresses itself through polls and communication with
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elected officials and leads to a response by elected 
officials consistent with the public's opinion. This 
response is institutionalized in law or bureaucratic 
procedure which is permanent and enduring.
It is important to note, however, that this model is
only a skeletal framework for understanding national
learning. There may be other impetuses to bureaucratic
change, and thus national learning, which work in
conjunction with public opinion which could significantly
enhance the model. G. John Ikenberry in his study of
American economic policy found the following:
In a variety of historical cases... government 
officials play a more active and innovative 
role and state structures play a more 
crucial shaping and constraining role than 
conventional wisdom predicts.90
Thus, Ikenberry found that the state often acts as far more
than a terrain upon which decisions are made. Rather, it
often acts as an intervening variable which "shapes the
entire course of political battles."91 The same is true of
decisions affecting American foreign policy. While societal
90G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional 
Approach to American Foreign Policy," International
Organization (Winter 1988), 220.
91Ibid.
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forces, such as public opinion, may be the primary catalysts 
to bureaucratic change, the institutions of the state, too, 
must be recognized as influencing these changes, as well 
because "institutional structures mediate the interests and 
capacities of individuals and groups within them."92 Thus, 
a possible future line of research to further enhance my 
model of national learning would be an incorporation of the 
state as an intervening variable in producing bureaucratic 
change.
This model is similar to Levy's in several ways.
First, like Levy, I believe that in order to qualify as 
national learning, change must be relatively permanent. 
Policy change alone is not sufficient for learning because 
policy change is rarely permanent. Second, I believe change 
in bureaucratic procedure and routine to be the vehicle 
through which this type of permanent change is achieved. 
Bureaucratic procedural change not only tends to be 
permanent and enduring, but also provides a tangible way of 
determining if in fact learning has occurred. Thus, both 
Levy and I identify bureaucratic change as the dependent 
variable in our models. Third, Levy and I also agree on a
92Ibid. , 243*-.
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minimalist definition of learning defined as "a change of 
beliefs, skills or procedures based on the observation and 
interpretation of experience."93 I regard as superfluous 
the ongoing debate regarding whether a change in beliefs at 
any level other than the fundamental beliefs level is truly 
learning. As George Breslauer states, the choice of 
definitions of learning need not be consequential, "as long 
as the reader is aware of the definitional choices at 
work."94 Finally, I support Levy in his belief that the 
"efficiency" and "accuracy" criteria should be abandoned due 
to their subjectivity. As Levy states, "To insist on an 
accuracy criterion would either result in research that is 
less rigorous, more subjective, and more dependent on the 
analytical and normative biases of the analyst or it would 
paralyze analysis because of the lack of measurable 
standards " .95
Though Levy and I agree on the definitions of both 
individual learning and national learning, we disagree on 
the key actors involved in national learning. While Levy
93Ibid. , 296.
94Breslauer, 826.
95Levy, 2 93.
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identifies the policy-maker as the key actor who initially 
learns and then encodes change in bureaucratic procedure, 
the focus of my model is much broader. According to my 
model, it is the American public who initially learns and 
thus is the key actor. Levy and I also disagree on the 
fundamental mechanism through which national learning 
occurs. In my model, the mechanism through which national 
learning then occurs is the influence of public opinion upon 
legislators who then enact bureaucratic change, whereas 
Levy's model identifies the policy-maker making changes in 
bureaucratic procedure as the primary learning mechanism. 
Moreover, according to my model, it is not necessary for the 
individual policy-maker himself to have learned at all. 
Instead of being motivated by learning at the personal 
level, he is motivated by a desire to stay in office and is 
therefore responding to his constituency rather than his own 
learning experiences. Thus, lawmakers may have learned, but 
this learning is not necessary or sufficient for national 
learning to occur.
I also believe that domestic political structure is 
critically important to the understanding of national 
learning. Clearly, the national learning process varies
66
greatly among different types of political systems. This 
distinction needs to be made clearer in national learning 
models. The field would be well-served by scholars willing 
to develop theoretical learning models specific to different 
types of political systems. The need for such 
differentiated models becomes clear upon reviewing Sarah 
Mendelson's above-described theory of learning. While her 
conceptualization of learning is useful in understanding the 
dynamics of national learning within an authoritarian regime 
and its emphasis on the domestic side of learning is well- 
taken, it does not accurately reflect the national learning 
process within a democratic government. Its concept of 
power consolidating strategies, such as personnel changes in 
the "Politburo, Central Committee and various other 
ministries" as a key to the understanding of the learning 
process cannot be readily applied to a democracy.96 While 
Gorbachev may have had the ability to make personnel changes 
in such key political institutions, the executive in a 
democracy does not have such sweeping authority. Thus, the 
environment or political structure in which national 
learning occurs must be considered as a key component of any
96Mendelson, 328.
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model which strives to understand the underlying political 
processes at work.
Consideration of the context of national learning, 
however, does not mean that varying political systems will 
not share any of the same conceptual tools. For example, 
Mendelson's incorporation of the roles of epistemic 
communities and ideas in the national learning process are 
concepts that also may be useful in understanding learning 
in democracies, as epistemic communities often play a key 
role in the shaping of public opinion in democracies as well 
as authoritarian regimes. Often, through their exposure in 
the media, epistemic communities serve as shapers of public 
opinion. Because public opinion is a catalyst to national 
learning in democracies, these epistemic communities can in 
fact have great power within democracies, as well. Thus, 
there is clearly a need for learning models tailored to 
different types of political systems which reflect the 
political dynamics specific to each system.
It is clear that we still have much to learn in 
understanding the means by which nations learn. In this 
paper I have strived to 1) review some of the most prominent 
theoretical models of learning, 2) test one of the
conceptualizations through the case study method, and 3) 
offer an alternative, hopefully more useful model of 
learning at the national level. This model identifies the 
individual American public as the key actor in the national 
learning process. In addition, this model cites the force 
of public opinion on legislators to be the national learning 
mechanism and identifies bureaucratic change as the 
dependent variable. Finally, it incorporates context, or 
the nature of the political system, into its theoretical 
framework. Though much work remains to be done in an effort 
to refine this proposed model, such as a possible 
incorporation of the state as an intervening variable, it is 
my hope that it will serve as a starting point in forging a 
more useful national learning model.
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